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 This research assesses the impact of synchronous (real-time), text-based chat on military 
command and control (C2) processes.  Chat use among the services, particularly among joint 
forces, has evolved in ad hoc fashion to fill gaps in currently fielded C2 systems.  This growth-
by-improvisation inhibits clear definition of the underlying requirements: precisely what C2 
deficiencies are being addressed by text-based chat tools?  Or, from a bottom-up perspective: 
what capabilities do text-based chat tools bring to the war fighter?  In this study we employ a 
broad set of use-cases to further refine why operators use chat based on how they apply chat to 
their specific combat problems.  These use cases include ongoing combat operations in 
ENDURING FREEDOM, counter-insurgency operations in IRAQI FREEDOM, and disaster 
relief operations with Joint Task Force - Katrina.  The focus of this study is on establishing 
operators’ perceived requirements in light of the current capabilities delivered by the existing 
text-based chat tools.  From these “reverse-engineered” requirements we propose future work to 




















 Communication is the essence of C2, and the availability of real-time, text-based 
communications tools has led to a proliferation of ad hoc “solutions” for the warfighter.  
Currently within the services, every command appears to have its own preferred text-based chat 
client.  While these solutions fill short term requirements, they usually miss the mark of joint 
interoperability.  No standardized text chat tool for C2 has led to confusion and an inability to 
interoperate.  No official text-based chat requirements document exists for any of the services 
nor is there an official joint chat requirements document.  Further, there is no official support for 
text-based chat from the services’ program offices.  In effect, within the U.S military there is a 
tool used extensively for C2 with no official requirements, no official support, and no official 
sponsorship.  
 This paper first assesses the impact of synchronous (real-time), text-based chat on 
military command and control (C2) processes.  Operational chat usage is documented across the 
warfighting functions and the full spectrum of military operations with a brief selection of use 
cases from Eovito (2006).  The current trend in chat research focuses on the technical aspects of 
chat based off anecdotal evidence, both of which serve to obscure development of a coherent 
problem statement.  This research consolidates specific cases of chat use to better develop insight 
into the problem, catalog capability gaps, and generate high-level requirements.  
 There is risk associated with various chat tools and protocols.  Technical risks are the 
most documented by organizations like the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).  In 
this paper, we assess not only technical risks, but other risks that are very difficult to assign 
metrics to, like those related to organization, human nature, situational awareness, and perhaps 
most interestingly, the impact of chat use on other C2 methods.  
 We finish with an explanation of the methodology used for documenting and developing 
the chat requirements.  The quad-service chat requirements and select Combatant Command 
(COCOM) requirements from Eovito (2006) are listed as appendices.  These high level 
requirements decompose the chat problem to a level that users, engineers, and managers alike 
can use, discuss, and understand.  From this common understanding all stakeholders can work 
together to develop a set of combined and joint, text-based chat requirements for the next-




 Modern chat tools allows multiple, concurrent users real-time participation in multiple 
chat channels (chat rooms).  The conversations within these channels are referred to as threads.  
The use of client-server architecture provides the ability to scale a population of users from a few 
locally to thousands globally.  Internet Relay Chat (IRC) is one of the most widely used chat 
protocol for military C2 (Boettcher 2005; Duffy 2005).  This study considers chat usage 
regardless of type, whether chat specific tools like mIRC or Microsoft Chat (MS Chat) or 
embedded chat functionality found in many C2 systems and collaborative suites like 
InfoWorkSpace (IWS). 
 Chat use by the military grew rapidly during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  Not only did chat usage grow on its own, we saw chat usage 
grow to supplement (or in some cases replace) other C2 systems.  The experiences of the United 
State Navy and the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) illustrate this. 
 Early during OEF there was one IRC server in the Navy’s Fifth Fleet that averaged 300 
concurrent chat users (Banerjee 2005).  Chat use soon overcame capacity and a second IRC 
server was installed in Fifth Fleet supporting approximately 500 concurrent users (Banerjee 
2005).  Chat use grew drastically during OIF and two more IRC servers installed, bringing the 
totals to four servers supporting approximately 2500-3000 concurrent users in 350-400 chat 
channels (Banerjee 2005; Heacox 2004). 
 Prior to OIF, USCENTCOM used the Defense Collaborative Tool Suite (DCTS) chat 
programs during exercises in Saudi Arabia; however, DCTS provided inadequate chat capability 
(no multiple room support) and USCENTCOM J6 made the switch to IWS (Jara and Lisowski 
2003).  The bandwidth requirements of chat with IWS created latency problems and 
USCENTCOM switched to the US Naval Forces Central Command’s (USNAVCENT) four IRC 
servers in Bahrain, which continue supporting all areas of operations (Banerjee 2005; Jara and 
Lisowski 2003).  Currently servers at USNAVCENT, Al Udeid Airbase in Qatar, HQ 
USCENTCOM, and DISA support the following chat clients: mIRC, MS Chat, JABBER, and IE 
Web Browser clients (Moore 2005).  
 Users rapidly realized text chat was a mission essential C2 tool and discussion grew 
about the lack of official requirements, official support, and official sponsorship.  The Navy’s 
program office, Space and Naval Warfare Command (SPAWAR) reacted first.  In response to 
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the Navy’s text chat needs, Joint Distributed Command and Control Technologies SSC-SD, 
SPAWAR Systems Center San Diego (SSC-SD) hosted the 1st Annual Internet Relay Chat 
(IRC) Conference in 2004.  All four services, numerous COCOMs, and Other Government 
Agencies (OGA) attended.  This conference’s purpose was to identify chat users and provide 
support to them throughout the Department of Defense (DoD).  While focused on IRC protocol-
based chat tools, this conference supported users of all chat tools, discussed emerging 
technologies, and the way forward within DoD.  The 2nd Annual IRC Conference was held in 
June 2005 and was again attended by all four services, numerous COCOMs, and OGAs.   
 During the June 2005 conference, Joint Distributed Command and Control Technologies 
SSC-SD was tasked with developing the joint chat requirements for a Joint Resource Oversight 
Council (JROC) package by Joint Chiefs of Staff J-6 (JCS-J6) and Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)).  The research in this 
paper is part of that effort. 
 
USE CASES 
 The warfighter has expanded the role of chat across the full spectrum of military 
operations.  Commanders and innovative operators at all levels and units have grown their own 
chat solutions to complex C2 problems despite the many systems fielded to solve the same.  Chat 
is used by the warfighter to put steel on target, or conversely, to build schools and repair 
mosques.  These operational examples are intentionally broad to provide a brief yet substantive 
illustration of the far-reaching use of chat for military C2. 
A. J-3 OPERATIONS 
 1. Multinational Operations 
  Her Majesty’s Canadian Ship (HMCS) TORONTO (FFH-333) participated in 
OPERATION ALTAIR (Canadian OEF parallel) in 2004.  She deployed as a fully integrated 
escort of the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON’S (CVN-73) Carrier Strike Group (CSG) to the 
Arabian Gulf.   
  The CSG exercised C2 with chat over SIPRNET (Secure Internet Protocol Routed 
Network), which HMCS TORONTO (the CSG’s only foreign ship) could not access.  Canadian 
Forces task by voice; however, the CSG used the coalition wide area network (COWAN) chat 
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for tasking HMCS TORONTO, with voice circuits as backup.  United Kingdom and New 
Zealand vessels in the area of operations (AO) were also on COWAN chat. 
  TORONTO stood picket duty in sector screen for the CSG, tasked and 
coordinated over COWAN chat.  Tasking orders for urgent maritime interdiction operations 
(MIO) were sent to HMCS TORONTO over the COWAN chat and she boarded 123 ships for the 
CSG.   
  The Combat Officer, HMCS TORONTO summed up chat issues from the 
Canadian point of view.  The U.S. Navy did not rely on a single chat tool for C2.  With HMCS 
TORONTO as the only non-U.S. warship it was easy for the CSG to overlook the need to use 
COWAN chat.  Even with a liaison officer (LNO) aboard the George Washington and six 
months together, the U.S. never made the leap to using COWAN and continued using primarily 
SIPRNET chat.  The recommendation was that coalition forces should use coalition networks. 
 2. Disaster Relief Operations/Civil Military Operations 
  Amphibious Squadron Four (PHIBRON4), embarked aboard the USS IWO JIMA 
(LHD-7), used chat for C2 during humanitarian operations with Joint Task Force-Katrina (JTF-
Katrina).  Chat was used extensively to plan, task, and coordinate pre-deployment and underway.  
Upon arrival in New Orleans, the movement of amphibious craft for transporting personnel, 
equipment, and supplies ashore was coordinated and tracked through chat.  Situation Reports 
(SITREPs) from the ships and detachments ashore were sent to PHIBRON4 with chat and then 
sent from PHIBRON4 to Amphibious Group 2 (PHIBGRU2) by the same means.  After 
Hurricane Rita, the USS TORTUGA (LSD-46), in Cameron, Louisiana, passed information on 
its amphibious craft operations and SITREPs over chat to PHIBRON4, still embarked on the 
USS IWO JIMA in New Orleans. 
  Canada executed Operation UNISON in response to Hurricane Katrina, sending 
its East Coast Task Group, including HMCS TORONTO (FFH-333), to Biloxi, Mississippi 
during September and October of 2005.  Operations were reported to the USS Saipan using 
Maritime Command Operational Information Network (MCOIN) chat (MCOIN facilitates 
Canadian maritime C2 with U.S. Navy).    The Canadian Task Group requested and coordinated 
landing support for its engineers, wood, generators, and other supplies over MCOIN chat. 
  United States Marine Forces Atlantic (USMARFORLANT) recognized a gap in 
its C2 capability during JTF-Katrina operations.  The USMARFORLANT lessons learned from 
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JTF-Katrina included one entitled “Real Time Information Dissemination.”  Watch Officers had 
difficulty disseminating timely information with email.  Citing successful chat usage in OIF for 
the conduct of fire [fire support] and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations, it was 
recommended that USMARFORLANT establish chat rooms to support real time information 
dissemination (Gray 2005). 
  The Area of Responsibility (AOR) for the U.S. Southern Command 
(USSOUTHCOM) is a huge geographic area where disaster relief efforts are not uncommon and 
civil military operations (CMOs) are the norm.  Headquarters USSOUTHCOM uses the chat 
capabilities of DCTS to coordinate and support CMOs in its AOR.  Chat was used to coordinate 
disaster relief efforts for the flooding in Guatemala caused by Hurricane Stan in 2005. 
 3. Antiterrorism/Homeland Defense 
  An antiterrorism vignette from Commander Coast Guard District 14 message 
162008Z MAY 03, After Action Report: Terrorism Threat on Board Cruise Ship Legend of the 
Seas (LOS), 22-24 April 03: 
On 22 April 2003 Royal Caribbean Cruise lines cruise chip Legend of the Sea (LOS) was 
en route from Ensenada, Mexico to Hilo, Hawaii for a scheduled port call with 1668 
passengers and 701 crewmembers.  A cleaner found a written note in a restroom 
threatening the lives of American passengers onboard.  LODS reported the note to Royal 
Caribbean Cruise Lines who informed the National Response Center (NRC) and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).  Captain of the Port, Honolulu, ordered LOS to 
not enter port and divert to anchorage offshore.  A 123 member multi-agency boarding 
was conducted to secure and clear LOS (D14 2003).  
 
  Coast Guard District 14 (D14) assumed Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for the 
boarding and operated in two SIPRNET chat rooms that included USCG Pacific Area, US 
Pacific Command (USPACOM), Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet, and 93rd Weapons of Mass 
Destruction Civil Support Team (93rd WMD-SCT).  
  A Marine Corps Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) vignette from the 2003-
2004 deployment of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Special Operations Capable 
(SOC) in the Arabian Gulf: 
The Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) Commander is aboard the shouldering ship 
with laptop and chat connectivity.  The Force Platoon Commander is on the boarded 
vessel.  They were in contact over voice radio, but the MSPF Commander was in contact 
with the Landing Force Operations Center [LFOC] aboard a US Navy amphibious ship 
using chat.  Prowords for mission segments, information requests, and the unfolding 
mission were passed and tracked in chat.  The LFOC passed additional tasking to the 
 8
MSPF as the mission progressed.  The VBSS resulted in the seizure of hashish with an 
estimated value in the millions. 
 
 4. Special Operations 
  In 2002 and 2003, during OEF in Afghanistan, units from Third Special Forces 
Group (Airborne) operated widely dispersed as part of the Combined Special Operations Task 
Force (CJSOTF).  Third Group was equipped with AN/PSC-5 Satellite Radios, but assigned a 
single voice satellite communications (SATCOM) channel shared by the entire CJSOTF within 
the theater and reserved for command, emergencies, or units in contact.  The SATCOM radios 
were data capable with ruggedized laptops allowing Special Forces teams to send free text 
messages.  This is significant, because despite not having an actual chat tool, units used the free 
text messaging capability to provide an improvised chat (more specifically instant messaging) 
functionality to fill the C2 gap.  Army Special Forces firebases always had SATCOM 
connectivity with the text messaging capability running and most business within the firebases 
was conducted by text conversations.  While on the move during operations, teams were 
contacted over voice SATCOM and told to come up on the laptops for text messaging. 
  One Special Forces Operational Detachment A (ODA) Commander recounted 
how this text-based communications capability aided operations.  His ODA team was operating 
in an area where another unit’s mission fell through.  His team received a voice call over 
SATCOM to come up on SATCOM data.  With the text messaging capability he received a 
fragmentary order (FRAGO), acknowledged receipt, and discussed operational details.  This 
improvised chat capability allowed the ODA team to execute the FRAGO much more rapidly 
than if a voice exchange had taken place.  The ODA executed a cordon and search of a small 
village, resulting in two personnel under control (PUCs – enemy combatants; not prisoners of 
war) and capture of a weapons cache.  The SITREP was sent to higher headquarters using the 
improvised chat capability, which would read it and start asking questions back. 
  In another case, after mission completion, an ODA team sent a SITREP to higher 
headquarters using the improvised chat.  The CJSOTF replied immediately concerning the PUCs 
the ODA had in custody.  The ODA Commander replied, telling the CJSOTF when and where 
the Afghan Militia Forces (AMF) captured the PUCs, passed their descriptions, what PUC1 and 
PUC2 said when debriefed, and that they had dual identification that did not check out.  He also 
reported that they had weapons and were seen leaving a large cache with rifle propelled grenades 
 9
(RPGs), Soviet style mines, detonation cord, etc.  Information continued to be passed and then 
the CJSOTF directed the ODA team to maintain positive control of the PUCs and document all 
information about them.  The total, detailed exchange required only a couple of minutes with the 
improvised chat. 
 5. UAV Operations 
  Sixth Marine Regiment used chat for global collaboration during Direct Support 
(DS) UAV operations.  Sixth Marines, in Afghanistan for OEF, used chat to communicate with 
the Air Force UAV pilot and payload operator at Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada.  During 
the UAV mission, the regiment requested specific actions by the pilot and the payload operator 
in real time, while the Army Collection Manager for the CJTFs monitored the chat room and 
tracked the mission.   
  Second Battalion, Fifth Marines (2/5) used chat for UAV operations in OIF I and 
OIF II.  Chat allowed 2/5 to direct the pilot and the payload operator during the mission and 
disseminate what the UAV was seeing.   
  Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron Two (VMU-2) used chat extensively 
during OIF II and OIF III.  Chat was used for UAV support to targeting, strike execution, and 
close air support (CAS) for units supported by VMU-2 UAVs.   
 6. Targeting 
  Third Infantry Division (3ID) OIF targeting vignette:  
“Baghdad...watched a BM-21 moved to outskirts of city S/SE; fires 3-5rounds, returns to 
city.  3ID following on UAV (in DS to DIV) and tracks launcher back into the city where 
launcher links with re-supply vehicle.  96D SGT HOLT, Paul is watching on GBS 
[Global Broadcast System] monitor and is in mIRC Chat talking to Air Force FAC 
[Forward Air Controller] while the Targeting Officer, 1LT Elizabeth Snyder is talking to 
CFACC [Combined Force Air Component Commander] in parallel.  SGT Holt verifies 
grid and confirms target.  Air force destroys target.  Total time of sensing to shooter - 20 
minutes...would have been earlier but he [BM-21] was driving in residential area...ACE 
did not see the re-supply vehicle in the field he drove into until the BM-21 stopped at its 
hide site” (Bell, Gainey, and McCoy 2003).  
 
  The US Air Force’s 421st Fighter Squadron used SIPRNET-based chat for time 
sensitive targeting.  This allowed collaboration with the Combined Air Operations Center 
(CAOC) at Al Udeid Airbase for questions on targets, the ATO, or strike-related questions and 
coordination with parallel agencies.  Dynamic targeting and strikes were also facilitated by chat.  
For example, a ground unit calls in a troops in contact (TIC) report, the information flows to 
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squadron operations, which can then re-task aircraft to collect targeting intelligence or to execute 
CAS.  This applied to situations beyond troops in contact like pipeline attacks or suspicious 
activity where jets from the 421st would be re-tasked to a specific target for surveillance.  The 
squadron monitored the mission and watched the CAOC direct events.  Monitoring the mission 
in chat aided in debrief preparation and expedited the debrief/mission report process once the 
pilots returned. 
 7. Close Air Support 
  During OIF the 4th Air Support Operations Group (4th ASOG) attached to the US 
Army V Corps used chat continuously for CAS execution among US Army V Corps, Coalition 
Land Forces Component Command (CFLCC), Combined Force Air Component Commander 
(CFACC), and Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF).  They provided C2 for all CAS V Corps 
CAS missions and considered chat absolutely critical to mission accomplishment because it was 
the most expedient method of communication and allowed real-time collaboration. 
  Chat was used by 4th ASOG to task UAVs (Predator, Hunter, Shadow, Global 
Hawk) and other assets to collect and disseminate intelligence to Tactical Air Control Parties 
(TACP), CAS aircraft, V Corps ACE (Analysis and Control Element), and any other units 
requiring the information for CAS execution.  Chat was further used for de-confliction of CAS, 
joint fire support, and of CAS and UAV airspace, real-time, within V Corps, MEF, CFACC, 
UAV units, and Air Force Distributed Ground Stations (AF DGS) – the people exploiting UAV 
imagery. 
  The 22d MEU (SOC) in Afghanistan for OEF coordinated details of emergency 
CAS tasking over chat, mainly for the requesting, allocating, and tasking stages.  The senior 
watch officer would post TIC reports in the main chat room and CAS details would be worked 
out in the same room or in private chat with liaison officers at CJTF-76 ACCE.  Changes to chat 
were discussed in chat before and during the mission.  Changes would be sent to coordinating 
agencies in chat and from there radioed to airborne aircraft.  The Marine Direct Air Support 
Center (DASC) used chat to update what aircraft would execute CAS and their status (i.e. 
tanking, time remaining on station).   
 8.  Combat Recovery 
  The 421st Fighter Squadron used chat extensively in every combat search and 
rescue (CSAR) mission during OIF (Eovito 2006).  Chat was the primary tool used with 
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UHF/VHF voice circuits for airspace de-confliction and other supporting arms and coordination 
of close air support (CAS) for combat recovery missions.  The 24th MEU (SOC) used chat 
during OIF I and OIF II to request aircraft for combat recovery missions and pass information.   
  Helicopter Anti-Submarine Squadron Three (HS-3 “TRIDENTS”) embarked 
aboard the USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65) for OEF, used chat for joint CSAR.  The TRIDENTS 
supported joint maritime CSAR and CSAR for western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan. 
  Chat was also used for search and rescue missions (SAR) in the United States. 
Again, HS-3 used chat, this time to coordinate a joint Navy and Coast Guard maritime rescue off 
of North Carolina. 
 9. Medical Evacuation  
  Chat played a significant role in the medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) process 
around the world and across the spectrum of military operations.  Chat was used in Afghanistan 
during OEF by CJTF-180 to coordinate MEDEVACS of combat and non-combat casualties.  The 
CJTF also used chat to clear fires in the MEDEVAC airspace.  The 22nd MEU (SOC) also used 
chat for MEDEVACS as part of CJTF-180 and later CJTF-76 in Afghanistan during OEF.  Units 
posted MEDEVAC nine lines to the main chat room and the MEU would either task our organic 
air with the MEDEVAC over chat or use chat to request support from higher headquarters.   
When Third Battalion, Sixth Marines (3/6) received a unit in contact report they immediately 
monitored the MEDEVAC preparations in the aviation brigade’s chat room and passed 
MEDEVAC information to the CJTF in chat.  
  During two deployments to Iraq, Helicopter Marine Heavy Squadron-465 (HMH-
465) received tasking from higher to execute MEDEVACs.  The 9-line (MEDEVAC) 
information was passed to the squadron over chat and then handed to the MEDEVAC pilot just 
prior to launch.  This information included grid coordinates, radio frequencies, what to expect at 
the landing zone (LZ), etc. 
  Chat was also used to coordinate MEDEVACs during Disaster Relief Operations.  
The USS IWO JIMA used chat to coordinate MEDEVACs as part of JTF-Katrina  
 10. Meteorological and Oceanographic Support to Joint Operations 
  Meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) forecasting support affects joint and 
combined operations across the full military spectrum.  Chat has proven a vital tool for 
coordinating weather forecasts for various theaters.  Southern Command METOC (J332) 
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personnel used chat during Operation SECURE TOMORROW to coordinate weather support for 
Royal Canadian Air Force helicopters flying in-and-around Port-au-Prince, Haiti.   
 The 28th Operational Weather Squadron (OWS) at Shaw Air Force Base (AFB), South 
Carolina used chat to support OEF/OIF.  With chat they conducted forecast coordination, 
tailoring, and dissemination to in-theater units from one platform.   
 The lack of weather data in Iraq complicated forecasting efforts, but with chat METOC 
units at the CAOC, Al Udeid Airbase, Qatar and others spread throughout Iraq could collaborate 
with each other and with the regional forecasting center at Shaw AFB.  The collaboration 
enabled by chat enabled them to develop one general forecast for the entire theater. 
 US Central Air Forces Command (USCENTAF) METOC used chat to provide weather 
support to all four services in both the OEF and OIF theaters.  Chat was used to communicate 
with units in the field and discuss weather products.  These units in the field were able to act as 
“eyes forward”, feeding weather information back to USCENTAF that was integral to their 
product construction.  They found chat use provided a more constant and reliable flow of 
information than other available methods (i.e. phone, email).  With chat they were able to 
provide the best-tailored weather products to units because chat provided access to most units, 
enabling efficient, multi-person discussions that affected large groups of people.  The time-
sensitivity of some weather products was met with chat, which proved the fastest and most 
reliable method for their dissemination.  
B. J-2 INTELLIGENCE 
 1. Counterintelligence 
  Members of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) Detachment 
105, Robins AFB, Georgia provide real time counterintelligence support in the Metro-Atlanta 
and middle Georgia AOR.  They used chat for real-time discussion about intelligence and force 
protection information with the Clayton County Sheriff’s Office, Georgia Intelligence Sharing 
Analysis Center (GISAC) and other local law enforcement agencies.  Chat allowed AFOSI 
personnel to set up target areas to work sources and liaison with any nearby Air Force interests.  
Chat is used for planning and execution because of its ease of use. 
  2.  National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations 
  The US Air Force’s 55th Wing provided national intelligence support to OEF and 
OIF with their RC-135 Rivet Joint (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance platform) aircraft.  
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Chat was vital for real time re-tasking, target sharing, and indications and warning for ground 
elements.  More efficient than voice, chat allowed real-time connectivity with everybody at once, 
including in joint and combined forces in theater and reachback to various stateside agencies.  
The most common use of chat was for coordination between on-station RC-135 Rivet Joints, the 
CAOC, and strike aircraft and similar coordination with ground elements 
C. ASSESSMENT 
 There are many reasons warfighters choose to use chat.  When answering the question of 
why chat, many attributes were used (48 total).  Many of these attributes were synonymous, 
while others grouped well into subsets with each other.  For productive discussion we wanted to 
refine the reasons given for chat use into common language, so we combine and reduce this list 
to the top five reasons for use. 
 1. Faster 
 Faster applies the chat users’ ability to request, send, and receive large amounts of 
information in real-time.  This is particularly useful for tasking.  Tasks sent in email are 
immediately available for the recipient unit to read once you send it.  Various members of the 
unit tasked can immediately read it and begin task clarification and refinement within their 
respective functional areas using chat.  Subordinate and supporting units can also monitor these 
taskings and begin coordination and parallel planning, compressing the planning process and 
ultimately the time to prepare for mission execution.  Tasking within chat happens so fast that 
some feel the chain of command is bypassed because very often when higher headquarters tasks 
the intermediate headquarters, the tactical units already see the tasking and begin working.  
However; many units leverage this speed to generate operational tempo, particularly in the 
dynamic counterinsurgent and disaster relief environments.  Users report that chat aids in 
speeding up commanders’ OODA Loops (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). 
 Units are re-tasked fast with chat.  The use cases demonstrated this: CAS aircraft in the 
air, UAVs, Special Forces teams – these can all be dynamically tasked during the mission 
because of the speed generated with chat. 
 Faster also applies to the transmission time and turn around times of other systems.  
There is no need to draft a radio message, hand it to the Radio Watch Supervisor, and wait for 
the operator to send it.  Chat does not need to be read line by line like a radio message and 
copied down at the other end.  You do not have to retransmit sections of the message or read 
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back sections to ensure understanding like you do with radio.  Even if two actuals (commanders 
or staff officers) are talking to each other they (or somebody) need to take notes as grids, times, 
target numbers and the like are passed.  This is unnecessary with chat, generating speed and 
making it faster.   
 Finding a phone number, dialing it, waiting for an answer, and then waiting for the 
person you actually want to talk too to get on the line can be long process.  They may not be 
there requiring you to work with somebody else or even leave a message.  If they are there you 
have to read grids, targets, etc back and forth and copy them down.  Again, we see how chat 
generates speed. 
 Users point out that even email, file transfer, and web-based forms are too slow.  They 
spend time looking up email addresses and websites.  They do not have to wait on the distant end 
to read their requests and answer back.  This is slower than chat.  Now imagine you need to send 
the information to ten people in ten different units or agencies.  
 Chat is fast because it generates operational tempo.  The increased flow of information 
across units, functions, operational boundaries, and services increase speed in planning and 
speed in execution. 
 2. Easy 
 Easy does include convenience, but easy helps make chat fast.  With chat users have a list 
of who is in the room.  All users in the room can read the chat thread (unless sent private) so 
users do not need to look up email addresses, phone numbers, or radio network ids.   
 With many users in the room, no multiple radio calls, emails, phone calls need to be 
made.  Collaboration is the norm in chat, no need to coordinate it like white boarding sessions, 
conference calls, or video teleconferences.  The ability to monitor multiple rooms means that you 
can monitor multiple missions of various units.  Users feel it is easy to build and maintain their 
situational awareness this way. 
 Chat uses plain language that is easier to converse in and understand than radio procedure 
for example.  Chat automatically creates a record of the conversation in the room that you can 
refer back to for clarification or even review later for after action items.  Some chat tools can log 
their conversations so there is a record beyond what is currently displayed in the room. 
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 Users said that chat was easier than other communication systems like tactical radio 
networks, or secure telephones (STU-III/STE).  Some noted that is easier to type in Mission 
Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) gear with a gas mask than talk on a radio or phone. 
 One must be wary of the convenience factor, because chat may not be the best tool for all 
situations, but is used anyway.  For instance, a request that a user needs filled in hours or days is 
probably better sent over email than in chat.  Inundating chat with non-time sensitive information 
creates clutter, confusion, and makes chat slower and harder to use. 
 3. Availability 
 This attribute is a composite of attributes like connectivity, reliability, stability.  Users 
found (and now expect) chat to be there when other C2 systems are not.  Further, they expect the 
users they want in the room 24 hours a day, seven days a week. 
 When users enter a chatroom, they not only expect other users within their unit to be 
available, but “everybody else” worldwide.  Users cite chat’s ability to provide a collaborative 
C2 capability between multiple garrison (headquarters) units in the continental US and deployed 
units worldwide in a single tool.  This global capability is the minimum C2 capability expected 
by many warfighters interviewed.  Further, users expect chat to provide this capability over 
SIPRNET, high side (TOP SECRET networks), and even on Non-secure Internet Protocol 
Routed Network (NIPRNET) for coalition disaster relief operations like JTF-Katrina or 
Operation Unified ASSISTANCE.   
 Users find that chat is available when other C2 systems are not.  They reported that chat 
was the only form of communications in many cases, where units were too far for voice, and the 
available transmission systems lacked the bandwidth for larger C2 systems.  The geographic 
dispersion and topography of Afghanistan coupled with its lack of infrastructure is a perfect 
example.  Users at Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in Afghanistan during OEF reported having 
only a couple phone lines, which allowed only two concurrent phone conversations, but provided 
them the ability to dial in with chat and have several concurrent chat sessions.   
 Even when there is more robust transmission systems support, these systems lack the 
bandwidth for many workstations with larger C2 systems, so warfighters limit the number of 
these and use chat to fill this capability gap.  Many chat tools use very little bandwidth allowing 
more users to use chat than other C2 systems; these tools avoid latency and timing hits on the 
network.  When the network experiences issues and capabilities degrade (intentionally or not), 
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text-based chat is the minimum “gotta have” and generally available long after the other C2 
systems have stopped functioning. 
 Users know chat will be available and reliable and work that into their C4 plans.  When 
deployed, the first data system up in many cases is chat.  Chat is then used to coordinate bringing 
up and establishing connectivity with the other C2 systems. Chat is the user’s troubleshooting 
tool of choice, used for the global troubleshooting of SECRET and high side systems in theater, 
across theaters, and even with contractors stateside.   
 4. Efficient 
 Users like how chat allows them to send more data with far less expenditure of time and 
effort.  For example, various reports can be sent in chat while the user continues to look at the 
Common Operating Picture (COP); map software, or other tools.  They can monitor chat while 
working in these tools.   
 Stated before, chat’s capability for users to access multiple rooms and have conversations 
with multiple people with no extra effort is a capability strongly embraced by the warfighter.  
Returning to sending reports, users send reports to large groups of people with the same effort it 
takes to send it to one.  While reports can certainly be sent by email, chat allows other users who 
may not doctrinally need the report but are monitoring the chat room to receive it, increasing 
their SA at no additional cost in time or effort.  Chat allows users to be proactive rather than 
reactive within and across organizations.  One should note that this could lead to the dreaded 
overreact, or proactive action on bad information, and points to the need for good business rules.  
Some, organizations, like USCENTAF, have already developed chat business rules. 
 Users like how chat facilitates understanding with written text.  Time and effort is saved 
from repeating questions because you have it written before you – if information is missing users 
can identify it faster.  This persistence is not provided as efficiently with other C2 means that use 
paper logs or even digital methods like email where users waste time rifling through email 
chains. 
 Chat allows a division of labor between units throughout the world.  Preparation of the 
forecasts by the METOC in the use cases is a perfect example.  Deployed units drawing upon 
other units globally can experience economies of scale.   
 Technically, the operation of chat should breed efficiency.  We already mentioned 
bandwidth and latency, but with chat there is no retransmission of radio traffic or stepping on 
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each, no repeated phone calls back and forth.  This creates efficiency elsewhere; reduced radio 
traffic freeing voice nets for urgent tactical traffic, phones free for when needed, less load on 
email servers.  
 5. Required 
 This attribute is interesting and foreshadows some of the issues in the next section on 
chat risks.  If most business is done in chat, then you need chat to do business.  Users feel that 
without chat, their SA would be diminished and information dissemination and coordination 
would be a struggle.  In cases where chat did become unavailable, users did find themselves 
behind power curve trying to use other methods (particularly voice) because their business 
practices had actually changed (note that the business rules did not change with the practices).   
 Requirement goes beyond capability when you consider combined operations.  The 
HMCS Toronto’s experience demonstrated that chat is required during coalition operations, but 
not everybody is always on the same chat.  The Canadian ship’s call for a single chat was echoed 
by Expeditionary Strike Group Six (ESG-6).  The ESG noted that forces under tactical control of 
coalition forces should use a collation chat solution (in this case CENTRIX) where you would 
normally use SIPRNET-based chat (ESG-6 2005).  The counterintelligence use case 
demonstrated how a military unit was required to use chat with civil authorities to prosecute their 
force protection mission. 
 The attribute required goes back to the problem statement of this paper.  There are 
numerous chat tools in use that do not interoperate.  There are major issues during combined 
operations.  If we believe, as users claim, chat is a required tool for warfighting, we need 
representation and program support to facilitate standardization and interoperability. 
 
CHAT RISKS 
 Chat, like all military C2 systems, has associated internal and external risks that must be 
mitigated to an acceptable level.  The factors creating risk are technical, organizational, and 
related to Human Systems Integration (HSI).  These risks affect the baseline Information 
Assurance (IA) requirements of confidentiality, availability, and integrity set forth in DoD 
Directive 8500.1: IA (2002) and DoD Instruction 8500.2: IA Implementation (2003).   
 1. External Risks 
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  The external risks are those to critical infrastructure and parallel to the generalized 
threats to the Global Information Grid (GIG) and other national (coalition partners) networks 
(JCS and DISA 2005).  The peer to peer aspect (P2P) of chat includes risk, and was banned 
initially before being authorized conditional to adherence with the appropriate IA practices and 
Designated Approving Authority (DAA) approval (Wells 2004a and Wells 2004b).  This does 
not mean the risks were mitigated, but only accepted. 
 2. Internal Risks 
  a. Integrity 
   Internal risks are the greatest, with 75 – 80 percent of all network attacks 
and loss of proprietary or classified information attributed to internal, authorized users (JCS and 
DISA 2005).   Research has shown chat use can lead to a group phenomenon termed false sense 
of security, where things happen to quickly in virtual collaboration and lead to premature 
decisions (Wainfan, Lynne and Davis 2004).  This impacts the integrity of information in chat.  
The MEF Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) experienced information integrity issues within 
chat rooms during OIF ranging from erroneous grid coordinates, transposed numbers for times, 
and even an incorrect order to execute a Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel mission 
(TRAP) (Glasgow 2003). 
  b. Confidentiality 
   With most chat residing on the SIPRNET, confidentiality is less at risk by 
external disclosure than by disclosure to or lack of disclosure from internal users.  Many user ids 
used in chat are functional, making it difficult to know who is really in the chat room.  Some 
consider that human nature creates risk, with users lying about their identity, sharing accounts, 
failing to log out, account compromise, and somebody looking over your shoulder or even 
“sniffing” your conversation (JCS and DISA 2005).  Malicious software may be received and 
activated by users if coming from a “person” they are comfortable with in chat (JCS and DISA 
2005).    
  c. Availability 
   Availability is impacted by several factors, with bandwidth the major 
factor affecting units’ ability to use chat, particularly the chat capabilities of larger collaboration 
suites.  During Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, initial use of IWS chat by deployed 
METOC teams failed due to insufficient bandwidth, forcing all units supporting the Joint 
 19
Operations Area Forecast (JOAF) and switched to a smaller, less bandwidth intensive chat tool 
(Hey 2005; Symes 2005).  A similar instance happened to CJTF-Haiti METOC personnel from 
USSOUTHCOM using the DCTS chat software, which failed due to bandwidth and latency 
shortfalls (Kampmeyer 2004).  The Stryker Combat Teams of 3rd Brigade, 2ID used chat in Iraq 
to great effect; however, they too, suffered bandwidth-related availability issues (3rd Brigade, 
2ID 2004). 
 3. Tactical Information Exchange and Situational Awareness 
  Finally, chat can actually affect the units’ tactical operations and situational 
awareness.  The Combined Anti-Armor Teams (CAAT) of Weapons Company, Third Battalion, 
Fourth Marines struggled to receive important information in Iraq.  Important tactical 
information, TICs, be on the lookout (BOLO) reports, friendly troop movements, and more was 
sent in chat, not tactical radio networks leaving those units without chat out of the loop (Butler 
2005a; 2005b).  Recent research into human performance issues for supervisory control of the 
Navy’s new Tactical Tomahawk missile, reported by Cummings (2005) made the unexpected 
discovery that many subjects fixated on the chat interface and ignored the task of retargeting 
missiles in urgent situations.  The experiment subjects were repeatedly instructed that retargeting 
was their primary mission; however, they continued to fixate on chat answering all queries 
before the retargeting problems (Cummings 2005).  The Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, and Combat Officer (C5O) of the USS IWO JIMA, while standing watch noted that 
the volume of chat traffic inundated users with information.  This information deluge consisted 
of legitimate traffic and spurious requests from users requesting information in the names of 
higher headquarters units.  When the C5O started calling these users based off their profile 
information, he discovered they were lower ranking personnel collecting information for briefs 
and reports.  In most cases the information had already been passed and chat was being used 
because it proved easier to ask for the information directly than look it up.  
 Significant research opportunity exists looking into managing the risk of chat use.  
Technical solutions abound, but standardization and the ability to integrate cross-domain within 
our own forces, let alone with coalition partners, remain problems of policy and organizational 
behavior.  Organizational change must be coupled with HSI research to ensure success.  Only by 
addressing risk as a dependency of technical, organizational, and HSI issues will we reach an 




 The requirements documentation and development of by Eovito (2006) used the 
capabilities-based approach called for in current joint doctrine and joint acquisition.  The 
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (2005) and its Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) build the 
bridge between the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy and future joint 
capabilities through transformational change in Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, 
Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF).  The Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process is a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) 
composed of a structured, four-step methodology to define capability gaps, capability needs, and 
approaches to provide functional or operational capabilities defined in the JOCs to the future 
joint force (CJCSI 2005; CJCSM 2005). 
 This research concentrated on the definition of C2 capability gaps filled by chat and 
identification of capability needs to develop a set of warfighter requirements.  This top down, 
systems engineering approach focuses on interoperability when decomposing the chat capability 
needs of DoD, federal and local agencies, and our coalition partners into requirements.  This is 
crucial because while many organizations listed the same gaps and requirements, they had very 
different ideas of what those requirements meant to them (i.e. a bandwidth austere environment 
to the Navy is very different from that of the Air Force).  The explicitly stated quad-service 
requirements and selected COCOM and OGA requirements are summarized in appendices one 




 Chat use has permeated all aspects of military operations.  While considered an ad hoc 
“solution” for the warfighter filling short term requirements, chat is actually changing units’ 
business practices, while the business rules regarding chat are not necessarily keeping up.  This 
poses the question, “does chat support doctrine making warfighters more lethal, or does chat 
supplant doctrine, allowing corners to be cut?”  We must establish an official set of 




TEXT-BASED CHAT REQUIREMENT COMPARISON 
Requirement USN USMC USA USAF 
FUNCTIONALITY 
Participate in Multiple Concurrent Chat Sessions X X X X 
Display Each Chat Session as Separate Window     
Persistent Rooms & Transitory Rooms X X  X 
Room Access Configurable by Users X X  X 
Automatic Reconnect & Rejoin Rooms X    
Thread Population/Repopulation X  X  
Private Chat “Whisper” X    
One-to-One IM (P2P)    X 
User Configured System Alerts X    
Suppress System Event Messages  X X   
Text Copying     
Text Entering     
Text Display     
Text Retention in  
Workspace     
Interrupt Sessions     
Foreign Language Text Translation     
Naming Conventions Identify Functional Position X X X  
Multiple Naming Conventions X    
Multiple User Types    X 
Distribution Group Mgmt System for Users     
Date/Time Stamp X  X X 
Chat Logging X X X X 
User Access to Chat Logs X D  X 
INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
Access Control     X 
PKI Enabled (DoD CAC)    X 
User authentication via Active Directory and LDAP 
ver3    X 
Unique ID for all users worldwide    X 
Provide Encryption    X 
Multi-Level Security Operation  D   
SCALABILITY 
Austere Network Operation X D X X 
Low Overhead Login Process X    
Use Client Without Server X    
Distributed Architecture X   X 
# Concurrent Chat Sessions X    
# Concurrent Users X  X X 
Specified Quality of Service X    
INTEROPERABILITY 
DoD Standards X   X 
Multi-Platform Clients X   X 
Interoperate with Existing Collaboration Systems  X  X 
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Participate in Multiple Concurrent Chat Sessions X X  X 
Display Each Chat Session as Separate Window X   X 
Persistent Rooms & Transitory Rooms    X 
Room Access Configurable by Users X    
Automatic Reconnect & Rejoin Rooms    X 
Thread Population/Repopulation  X  X 
Private Chat “Whisper”     
One-to-One IM (P2P)   X X 
Off-line Messaging    X 
User Configured System Alerts   X  
Suppress System Event Messages      
Text Copying X    
Text Entering X    
Text Display X    
Text Retention in Workspace X    
Interrupt Sessions X    
Foreign Language Text Translation X   X 
File Transfer  X   
Portal Capable  X   
Web Client  X  X 
Presence Awareness   X X 
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Multiple Naming Conventions X    
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Date/Time Stamp X X  X 
Chat Logging X  X X 
User Access to Chat Logs X  X  
INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
Access control   X X X 
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User authentication via Active Directory and 
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Network Security Tools  X X  
Cross Security Domain Functionality  X   
SCALABILITY 
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Low Overhead Login Process     
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Distributed Architecture     
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INTEROPERABILITY 
DoD Standards   X  
Open Standard    X 
Multi-Platform Clients   X  
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